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BOOK REVIEWS 
TIME CHANGES: A REVIEW OF To THE END OF TIME: THE 
SEDUCTION AND CONQUEST OF A MEDIA EMPIRE 
BY RICHARD M. CLURMAN 
Jayne W. Barnard* 
Back in the 1950s, Henry Luce, legendary founder of Time 
Magazine, was reviewing a business story for an upcoming issue. 
Disgusted by the tale of greed which unfolded, Luce scrawled across 
the top of the page, 
I resent the fact that these men are fighting for a huge 
chunk of the "national estate" without there seeming to be 
any point to the fight. None seems to stand for a damn 
thing. This is the sort of thing that turns one against 
capitalism. I resent having these great companies owned by 
pointless men like these. 1 
Indeed. If there is a theme to Richard Clurman's book on the 1990 
marriage between Time, Inc. and Warner Communications, it is that 
the men involved in making the deal were not only pointless, or at 
least shallow, as individuals but remarkably obtuse about their 
fiduciary obligations to the shareholders of their respective companies. 
Over and over throughout the book, Clurman portrays the toplevel 
managers of Time, Chairman J. Richard Munro and President N.J. 
"Nick" Nicholas, and Warner's CEO Steve Ross, as focusing on all 
the wrong questions as they put together the biggest media merger 
in history. These men's obsessions turned not on how to generate 
shareholder value, or even on how to accommodate the conflicting 
claims of their companies' "other constituencies," but on how to ensure 
that each would get the best managerial contract, the highest position 
on the corporate ladder, and the best executive compensation package 
when the deal was done. Clurman's descriptions of the machinations, 
tantrums, tears and tea leaves which ultimately led to the Time-
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary. 
Thanks to Lisa Nicholson and Joe English, both members of the class of 1993, for research 
assistance. 
1. RICHARD CLURMAN, To THE END OF TIME: THE SEDUCTION AND CONQUEST OF A 
MEDIA EMPIRE 30-31 (1991). 
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Warner merger2 make for sorrowful reading to anyone who values the 
notion of responsible corporate governance. 
The outline of the Time-Warner story is by now well known, having 
received the full attention of the Delaware Supreme Court3 and lengthy 
feature coverage in The New Yorker. 4 In 1987, Time's management 
began paying close attention to the growing number of hostile takeov-
ers in the television industry. Time was, by then, deeply involved in 
cable franchising and was the owner of HBO and Cinemax. Anxious 
about their own security, the "Time-incers" set about to find a merger 
partner that would enhance Time's position in the global media market, 
strengthen its lackluster management and, not incidently, serve as a 
shark-repellent. After considering and rejecting a possible merger 
with Gannett, Time's management turned to the possibility of a merger 
with Warner. 
Having concluded that Warner would be a good fit, 5 Time's Munro 
and Nicholas then undertook a campaign to persuade the board that 
a Time-Warner combination would not only enhance Time's market 
position but also could be effectuated without compromising the editor-
ial integrity of the magazines, especially Time. This latter considera-
tion was of special importance to Time director Henry R. Luce III, 
heir of Henry Jr. and owner of 4 1/2% of the outstanding Time, Inc. 
stock. 
Slowly and methodically, Munro and Nicholas persuaded Time's 
twelve outside board members to accept the idea of entering into a 
"transforming transaction."6 In July 1988, after months of massaging, 
the board gave its "go ahead" to actively pursue a merger with Warner. 
Weeks of negotiations followed, focusing on such issues as the name 
of the combined companies, the exchange ratio and the formula for 
2. The use of the term "merger" is generic. As will be seen, the transaction between Time 
and Warner was technically something quite different. 
3. Paramount Communications v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
4. Connie Bruck, Deal of the Year, NEw YORKER, Jan. 8, 1990, at 67. 
5. For example, 
Warner had just acquired Lorimar and its film studios. Time-Warner could make 
movies and television for use on HBO. Warner had an international distribution 
system, which Time could use to sell films, videos, books and magazines. Warner 
was a giant in the music and recording business, an area into which Time wanted 
to expand. None of the other companies considered had the musical clout of Warner. 
Time and Warner's cable systems were compatible and could be easily integrated; 
none of the other companies considered presented such a compatible cable partner. 
Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1144-45. 
6. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 147. 
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corporate governance. This last, "succession" issue, was the deal-
breaker, however, as Ross, reportedly in tears, refused to sign on to 
an agreement that would permit him to act as "co-CEO" of the com-
bined companies but would require him to retire within five years of 
the merger. 7 Ross felt this provision reflected Time's lack of confidence 
in his leadership, when in fact it really reflected Nick Nicholas' insis-
tence that he, the other designated "co-CEO," would be assured the 
top position before he became too old to make his mark. 8 
Talks between Time and Warner resumed in January 1989. Ulti-
mately, both boards approved a merger to be submitted to the com-
panies' shareholders. The terms of the deal were very similar to those 
discarded the previous summer. Nicholas and Ross would serve as 
co-CEO's, with Ross ultimately becoming chairman and Nicholas be-
coming sole CEO. As the deal neared completion, however, a new 
and very threatening player arrived on the scene. Sixteen days before 
the scheduled shareholder vote, Paramount Communications an-
nounced a cash tender offer for all the shares of Time at $175 per 
share ($50 above the estimated value of the Warner merger to Time 
shareholders of $125), 9 conditioned upon the termination of the merger 
agreement. 10 
Paramount quickly raised its offer to $200 per share, the stock 
market went crazy with desire, and Time responded by quickly cobbl-
ing together a new deal with Warner. Instead of merging with Warner, 
or canceling the deal and letting the market take its course (presum-
ably, but not necessarily, in favor of the Paramount offer), Time agreed 
to borrow close to $10 billion, virtually overnight, and use the funds 
to buy a majority of Warner's outstanding stock at $70 per share, a 
55% premium over market. 11 The beauty of this deal was that it would 
not require shareholder approval and could still derail the Paramount 
offer. The downside, of course, was that the debt incurred to finance 
the buyout would severely impair the combined companies' ability to 
grow into the next century. 
7. /d. at 168. 
8. One board member recalls this issue somewhat differently. Not only was Time committed 
to putting Nicholas into the driver's seat as soon as possible; it was also concerned that, unless 
forced to do so, Ross might not leave. According to Time director Donald Perkins, "[w]hat we 
were concerned about was [Ross'] refusal to talk about retirement. It was like getting in bed 
with Armand Hammer .... " /d. at 172. 
9. The Monks! Dingman Time Warner Letters , DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Winter 1989, at 24. 
10. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1147. 
11. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 237. 
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The public explanation for Time's choice of Warner over Paramount 
was that the Warner transaction "offered a greater long-term value 
for the stockholders and, unlike Paramount's offer, did not pose a 
threat to Time's survival and its 'culture.' "12 Hindsight now tells us 
that both these beliefs were misplaced, if not knowingly false when 
advanced. While, as of June 1989, Paramount was offering $200 in 
cash, the Time:-Warner deal could offer only the hope of future price 
increases as a result of the combined companies' synergy. In fact, that 
synergy has never paid off. After the merger, Time-Warner's share 
price never rose above $12413 and as of March 1992, was hovering at 
$105. 
As for the unique "Time culture," Time's magazine-focused mana-
gers never again enjoyed the position of power they had commanded 
in the post-Luce years. Only a few weeks passed after the merger 
before Time's executives moved from their dowdy headquarters to 
the upscale Warner Communications building. 14 More importantly, it 
was not long after the merger that Warner's financial team outpaced 
Time's and seized strategic control of the combined companies. 15 This 
shift in control led ultimately to the forced resignation of Nick 
Nicholas, the designated heir to the Time-Warner throne, when he 
found in early 1992 that he could not accept (or, worse, even influence) 
the Warner-dominated strategic plan. 16 
Some themes of Clurman's book do not bear directly on questions 
of corporate governance. There is, for example, the issue of social 
class. Clurman, himself an Ivy Leaguer in spirit if not in fact, 17 and 
a former chief of correspondents at Time, repeatedly points out the 
gaucheries of the Warner players by comparison to the elegance of 
the "Time-incers.'' Steve Ross, for example, "who sees every movie 
but never reads a book, calls the author of Madame Bovary 'Flow 
Bert.' "18 
12. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1149. 
13. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 271. 
14. !d. at 198, 315. 
15. In addition, the chief financial officer, the general counsel and the corporate secretary 
were also chosen from Warner's staff. !d. at 198. 
16. Geraldine Fabrikant, Heir Apparent at Time Warner is Out Amid Signs of Dissention, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1992, at Al. 
17. He is a graduate of the University of Chicago. One of Clurman's non-journalistic claims 
to fame is his recurring role in the sailing adventures of William F. Buckley. See WILLIAM F. 
BUCKLEY, RACING THROUGH PARADISE (1987); WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, ATLANTIC HIGH 
(1982) (each recounting transcontinental sailing trips of considerable elan). 
18. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 26. 
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Cheap shots like these, however, reveal a fundamental truth about 
the Time-Warner merger which Time's directors should have seen 
from the beginning, and that is that merging vastly differing corporate 
cultures is likely to come to grief. Time-Warner was not just a "cor-
porate interfaith marriage,"19 and Ross and Nicholas not merely an 
"odd couple."20 Rather, the merger of Time and Warner brought to-
gether a combustible mixture of personalities and values. Time's board 
should have recognized that "Warner and Time were as different from 
each other - in their people and their products - as the scrappy old 
Brooklyn Dodgers and the haughty old New York Yankees. Different 
leagues, different managers, different fans -same hometown."2 1 
Another recurring theme in Clurman's book is the romantic but 
misguided notion that a news-gathering organization has some inviol-
able right of self-determination and should be beyond the reach of 
corporate discipline. 22 Time's traditional separation of "church" (the 
magazines) and "state" (the company's publishing arm) took this notion 
far beyond the conventional view that advertisers ought not to influ-
ence news judgments. Indeed, Time's editor-in-chief reported directly 
to the board, and sat on the board, and was insulated by the terms 
of a written "charter" that ensured complete autonomy in selecting 
both content and editorial personnel. 23 
Rather than recognizing it for what it was - the lowest-common-
denominator of American journalism- Time's managers honestly be-
lieved that the magazine represented some sort of "mission"24 and that 
Time held some unique "bond of trust" with the American public. 25 
The grandiosity of Time's management on this issue colored the nego-
tiations with Warner at every step of the way. Time had to be per-
ceived as the surviving company, the flagship of the media empire;26 
19. ld. at 15. 
20. Roger Cohen, A Divorce in the Execttlive Suite, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1992, at OJ. 
21. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 26. 
22. News gatherers at the television networks suffered from the same misapprehension 
until corporate belt-tightening was imposed on them following the TV takeovers of the mid-1980~. 
See KEN AULETTA, THREE BLIND MICE: How THE TV NETWORKS LOST THF: IR WAY 
(1991) (describing the aftermath of the takeovers of CBS by Larry Tisch , of ABC by Capital 
Cities and of NBC by General Electric). 
23. The "Donovan Charter" took effect in 1978, shortly before editor-in-chief Hedley Dono-
van, who had succeeded Luce, stepped down in favor of Henry Grunwald. CLURMAN, 8npra 
note 1, at 40. 
24. ld. at 36. 
25. !d. at 221. Hedley Donovan took a more poetic view of Time's uniqueness. "This 'com-
pany' is not just a legal or business entity," he said. "I am also using the word in the olde1· 
sense, as in company of scholars, adventurers, or a company of voyagers. " l d. at 202. 
26. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1145. 
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Time's editor-in-chief had to be assured a seat on the combined com-
panies' board. Z7 This kind of posturing led Time's directors to overlook 
some of the more significant features of the deal, such as which of 
the merger partners would in fact be the surviving company,28 who 
would control the significant committees of the new board, 29 and what 
the strategic focus of Time-Warner would be. 
The real lesson of To the End of Time centers on the role of the 
Time board and its failure to take seriously its fiduciary obligations 
to Time's shareholders. Clurman complains that the board failed to 
interview Steve Ross or to demand access to internal Warner docu-
ments before signing off on the deal. 30 That is not the point. The 
board's failure has nothing to do with whether or not the directors 
vetted Warner's CEO. The board's failure lies instead in its unwilling-
ness to recognize the legitimacy of the shareholders' desire to take 
advantage of Paramount's $200 offer. The board refused even to meet 
with Paramount's representatives to see if an acceptable transaction 
could be worked out. 31 Contrary to the ruling of the Delaware Supreme 
Court, 32 this was not an exercise of business judgment. It was a demon-
stration of arrogance. 
As arrogant as he was, Henry Luce at least had his priorities in 
order on the issue of corporate control: "'I am a Protestant, a Repub-
lican and a free enterpriser,' he declared. 'I am biased in favor of 
God, Eisenhower and the stockholders of Time .... "'33 Obviously, and 
regrettably, Time's board did not share at least one ofLuce's biases . 
• 
27. CLURMAN, supm note 1, at 204. 
28. Warner stockholders ended up owning more than 62 percent of the combined companies. 
/d. at 192. 
29. "The chairmen of the board's key compensation committee (three Warner directors, 
two Time) and audit committee (3-3), were both to come from Warner." /d. at 198. 
30. /d. at 27, 174. 
31. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1147. 
32. Id. at 1152. 
33. JAMES L. BAUGHMAN, HENRY R. LUCE AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN NEWS 
MEDIA 173 (1987). 
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Bidders & Targets: Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. By Leo 
Herzel and Richard W. Shepro. Basil Blackwell, 1990. Pp. x, 523. 
David T. Brown* 
Bidders & Targets: Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. is an 
exhaustive treatment of both the law and economics of takeovers. Its 
self-contained text and technical appendixes make it accessible to both 
beginners and experts. Additionally, the book is extremely current. 
For example, it contains a lengthy discussion of the Time-Warner 
agreement which was not completed until late 1989. 
The authors, who have worked extensively as legal counsel in 
takeover contests, divide the book into three parts. Part one describes 
the current takeover market and how it evolved into its present state, 
beginning by explaining the legal rights and the economic incentives 
of directors, shareholders and CEO's. The authors argue that the key 
role of the directors of the target company is to increase the bargaining 
power of shareholders. Disorganized shareholders cannot effectively 
bargain with the bidder especially when faced with a coercive two-tier 
bid. The author's also discuss the role of anti-takeover charter amend-
ments in overcoming the problems which diffuse shareholders face. 
Unfortunately, managers may claim to fight an offer because it is 
inadequate when they actually are attempting to save their own jobs. 
Traditionally, there has been little legal recourse against target direc-
tors. However, in Smith v. Van Gorkom,I referred to as the "Trans 
Union" case, the Delaware courts took large steps toward weakening 
the business judgment rule. The authors provide a lengthy discussion 
of the implications of this landmark case. 
The authors argue in favor of increased scrutiny by institutional 
investors, and rules which are designed to give shareholders more 
power over directors. For example, they argue that shareholders of 
acquiring firms should be required to approve cash and stock offers. 
Currently, exchange rules only require shareholder approval for stock 
offers. 
Part one continues with a discussion of state and federal takeover 
laws providing a thoughtful discussion of the (1) legislative intent of 
*Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Florida. Ph.D., 1986, Washington University 
(St. Louis). 
1. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
153 
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the laws, (2) political forces that shape the evolving legal climate and 
(3) potential impact the Reagan appointees to the Supreme Court may 
have on future litigation over state anti-takeover laws. The authors 
argue that state takeover statutes tip the legal playing field in favor 
of targets. Since the takeover boom in the 1960s, many states have 
acted to protect firms incorporated in their state from hostile takeov-
ers. The authors state that the "first generation" anti-takeover statutes 
typically required state approval of hostile acquisitions. These laws 
were held unconstitutional in Edgar v. Mite Corp./ on the grounds 
that they unreasonably interfered with federal tender offer regulation 
and interstate commerce. 
The resulting "second generation" statutes have mandated strict 
modifications of the required majorities for approval of acquisitions of 
companies in particular states. These laws were recently upheld in 
CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America. 3 While these laws clearly violate 
the spirit of Federal laws, in particular the Williams Act4 which gov-
erns tender offers, the authors argue that the second generation stat-
utes are quite safe given the unwillingness of the current Supreme 
Court to interfere with state takeover legislation. 
The authors see very little recent change in federal corporate 
takeover law. The only recent change in the role of the federal govern-
ment has been a realization of the antitrust standards for approval of 
horizontal mergers. Part one ends with a complete discussion of various 
strategies available in corporate control battles including lock-ups, 
poison pills, squeeze-outs and leveraged buyouts. 
The first part of the book is outstanding. The authors distill many 
complex economic arguments about the incentives of shareholders and 
managers into an understandable form. Further, they provide a com-
plete discussion of the scientific evidence on these issues gathered by 
economists. The authors highlight their arguments by a discussion of 
the applicable law, theoretical economics, scientific evidence and exam-
ples from specific transactions. 
Part two of the book is titled "Advice for Bidders and Targets." 
In the introduction, the authors describe this section as "strategic and 
advisory." The strategies discussed are well developed extensions of 
the concepts discussed in part one. As a result, this section is both 
advisory to executives and valuable to other readers. The questions 
2. 457 u.s. 624 (1982). 
3. 481 u.s. 69 (1987). 
4. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)(1) & 14(d)(1, 5-7), (e) as amended 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d)(1, 5-7), (e). 
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that are discussed in this section include "friendly deals, what good 
is a contract?, should I make a hostile bid?," and "how should we 
defend against a hostile bid?" 
The authors identify the key issue for takeover bidders as avoiding 
competition from other bidders. Competitive auctions typically result 
in the bidder paying an inflated price for the target, and thus, the 
key to avoiding competition is to move quickly when making a bid. 
Further, the authors point out that the winning bidder in a competitive 
contest should be aware of the "winner's curse," that is the tendency 
for the highest bidder in any auction to pay more than the object is 
really worth. In the authors words, "[a] successful bidder may be a 
loser."5 
Part three includes a detailed discussion of the Time-Warner deal. 
This transaction is rich enough to demonstrate many of the concepts 
developed earlier in the book. The authors incorporate nearly all of 
the documents filed during this acquisition, thus giving the reader a 
good feel for many of the legal technicalities that are critical to a 
successful outcome. 
Finally, the book contains a one hundred page appendix that details 
the federal securities laws and Delaware and New York state laws 
that pertain to acquisitions. 
5. LEO HERZEL & RICHARD W. SHEPRO, BIDDERS AND TARGETS: MERGERS AND Ac. 
QUISITIONS IN THE U.S. 119 (1990). 
